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Australia and the Birth of Israel:
Midwife or Abortionist.
Howard Adelman
The tiny Republic, which embodied ttre ageold dreams of world Jewry and militant Zionism,
was born in 1948 with Evatt as midwife.
Introduction
When tlp First Committee of the Special Session of the United Natisrs convened on 6
lvlay L941, they had before them the 2 April request, of Sir Alexander Cadogan of the
United Kingdom, to place the question of Palestine on the Agenda and "to make
recommendations, under Article l0 of ttre Charter, concerning the fufurc government of
Palestine".l In order to expedite the process, Cadogan requested ttre Sectetary-General o
convene a special session of the General Assembly to constitute and instruct a Special
Committee to prepare a report for the General Assembly, The Commiuce became known
as UNSCOP,
LINSCOP consisted of eleven "neuEal" countries 
- 
two Commonwealth nations
(Canada and Ausralia), two Eastern European nations (Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia),
thtee Latin American counEies (Guatemala, Peru and Uruguay)" two Asian nations (ndia
and han) and two Western European nations (Sweden and the Netherlands). IJNSCOP
recommended partition by a vote of seven for, three against (they wrote a minority report
supporting a federal solution), and one abstention 
- 
Ausralia.
Using that report, a special Ad Hoc Committee chaired by the Rt Honoruable Dr H. V.
Evatt, then Deputy Prime Minister of Australia, Afiorney-General and Minister for
External Affairs, as well as Chairman of the Ausualian Delegation to tlrc UN,
recommended partition to the General Assembly. In tlte alphabetic roll call on the vote in
the Ad Hoc Committee, even though Ausralia held the Chair, Australia cast the fhst yea
vote for partition after Afghanisan voted against and Argentina abstained" On 29
November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly votBd by more than a two-thirds
m4iority to support partition.
Evatt was showered with cables and telegrams from Jewish organisations in Palestine.2
Evan describes how, after the partition vote in the United Nations, the Jewish people and"
their supporters' "display of gradnrde towards myself was most touching". Evatt went on
to say, with uncharacteristic modesty, that "I had only done what,I believed was just and
right as a good United Nations follower".3 Between that declaration of the UN aud the
date when Israel was bom on 15 May 1948, Evatt was regarded as one of the champions
of Israel. He fought attempts by the USA and the UK to reverse the pro-partition
* Special Onnks are due to Ms Gillian Redmond and the other staff of ttre Nuional fuchives of
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resolution and substitute a UN trusteeship. "I could not leave Australia at that time but I
sent a message which was broadcast tluoughout the world with the object of making it
clear that the proposed trusteeship plan was not only inadmissible and indefensible in
itself, but represented a complete sering aside of the decision of ttre previous Asrcmbly."a
He advocated tlnt the Security Council intervono with force to stop the Arab invasion. In
January 1948 under Evatt's leadenhip and inqpiration, Australia was the first goveniment
to give de jure, that is, fufl recognition, and not just de facto recognition to the new stiate
of Israel.
Evatt was considered strongly pro-Zionist.s He had close connectionswittr the Jewish
business community in Australia.6 Though the only Jewistr parliamentarians in Australia
at the time were on the Right, 'T-abor gained support (from Jewish voters) through Dr.
Evads key role at the United Nations in the estnblishment of Israel".7 Evatt was credited
with being one of the most important foreign stafesmen in ttre creation of Isael. He can
even be said to have been a midwife at Israel's birttr. Evatt *chalked up the birth of the
State of Israel to his credit as chairman of the United Nations ad loc committee on
Palestine. The tiny Republic, which embodied ttre ageold dreams of world Jewry and
militant Zionism, was born in 1948 with Evas as midwife. Great was the acclaim he
received from Jewish people al home and abroad. When he attended functions in his
honour given by Jewish organizations, he was always sue of 0re nearest thing in
Ausralia to a hero's welcome."S
However, very little has been written about Evatr's role on ttre substantive issues at
stake when the maffet was fitst put before the UnitBd Nations and when it was considered
in LJNSCOP, Chapter X of his book, TIu Task of Nations, deals witlr tlre first phase of UN
involvoment in the Palestine issue in the sening up of LINSCOP. Other than crediting
Ausralia with "the initiative at the General Assembly in rhe appointment of UNSC1)P"9
and the initiative in keeping the five great powers from being members of UNSCOP, ttre
main thrust of Evatt's own account is concerned to convey the impression that he actBd as
an exemplary impartial chairman of ttre proceedings of the Ad Hoc Committee dealing
with the LJNSCOP report while, at the same time, being resolute in ensuring that the work
of the committee moved expeditiously and made a decision. "In its handling of the
Palestine dispute ... [Evattl felt the Assembly had approached the problem not on rhe
basis of oxpediency but impartially and solely in terms of the best interqst of the
inhabitants."lo
Evatt does comment critically on the minority rcport of UNSCOP rocommending a
federal state. "In ttre legislature of this state, representation would have been given to
Arabs as well as Jews, but inasmuch as the fuabs outnumbered the Jews, the Jews would
have had no effective confrol within any portion of the proposed state. Migration of the
Jews could, and no doubt would, have been terminated or been drastically resricted by
the Arab majority with the result that the Jews would have becorne a pormanont minority
in Palestine with serious reperrcussions, and disaster o alt their hopes of national
survival."ll But it is unclear when he made this evaluation. For he statss clearly that when
he assumed the role of Chairman of the Ad Hoc Comminee, "I enlered upon the work of
the Committee without prejudices in favour of any particular solution".12
Commentiators have had little to say about Australia's abstention and Evatt's
transformation from a puryorted neutral spectator to an ardent pro-Israel advocate. Allan
Dalziel simply said that "Evatt worked for the establishment of the promised national
home for the Jews and the creation of the autonomous State of Isae1".13 Kylie Tennant
wrote that Evatt "supported the cause of Israel because he felt the Jewish people werc a
race that must havo a sanctuary".l4 In Alan Renoufs political biography, Let Justice Be
Done: The Foreign Policy of Dr. H. V. Evatt, his role is summarised in one paragraph:
No better testimony exists o Bvan's pursuit of justice than the part he played in tlre
establishment of tlre State of lerael. When Britain referred the Palestine problem to the General
Aseembly in April 1947, Evatt was instnrmental in having the Assembly set up a committee of
invoetigation Australk was a mernbor. In Augrst the committee poducod two reports: thc
mapdty r€pott remmmended partition into two independent stat€s, one Arab, one lewish; the
minority report, one fedorat€d state. Australia supported neitlrer solutisn. The General Assembly
appointed another committee to examine tlre repors, Evatt was chainnan In this committeg
Evatt camo out fot partitigg, and a plan for it was prepared, which the General Assenrbly
approved on 29 November.I)
The paragraph is more puzding than insighfrrl. On the one hand, it makes no rcference
to the British view, articulated by the Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech-Jones,l6 that lhe
major factor which scuppered the British sEarcgy and led the UN to endorse partition was
Evafi's decision as Chair of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question in the
autumn to work, on the one hand, in two seguat€ commiftees. One was prc-partition and
one anti-, witltout any real effort at the same time at conciliation between the fuabs and
the Jews in the ftird committoe. the charge was that the very committee sfuc[ue ho set
up mitigated against conciliation. The American State tteparunent concurred in the
British view of Evatt's failure to work for conciliation. Samuel K. C. Kopper of the Office
of Near Eastern and African Affairs not€d that 'the atrortive and utterly weak efforts of
Dr. Evatt to bring conciliation to bear during the General Assembly session can hardly be
classed as United Nations conciliation".lT
On the other hand, Renouf provides no roason why Australia abstained in the TINSCOP
mqior rpcommendation on partition, and then why Australia subsequently supported
parcition and Evatt became renowned as a champion of tle Israeli cause. Furtfiermore why
in the autumn of 1949, when a major diplomatic auack was made on Israel's jurisdiction
over Jerusalem, did Dr Evatt, vinually to everyone's suprise at the behaviour of someone
regarded as srongly pro-Israel, as one of his last acre as an international stat€sman,
support the campaign o reaffirm the UN resolution on internationalisation? Abba Eban,
liaison officer of the Jewish Agency to UNSCOP at the time and laucr Israel's ambassador
to the LJN and Foreign Minister, wrote that "We were never able to diagnose the cause for
llerben Evatt's snange obduracy in this mafier".l8 Was Evatt just an unpredictrble person
as the Americans believed?t9
The reasons why Evatt was greeted as a champion of Israel are not hard to find. Evan
was almost cereainly Aushalia's most brilliant Exlernal Affairs Minister. He was
intelligent, ambitious, authoriurive urd a very assertive potitician. He reigned supeme
over Ausfralia's foreign policy in the World War II and immediate post-World War II
period and was the crucial figure in establishing Ausaalia as a principal independent
player in the international atena no longer tied to the apron strings of Mother Britain.2o
Allan Dalziel, his seueary for twenty yearsf porhays Evatt as the "dsfender of human
rights and dignity" who wa^s never "devious or ambiguous, conspiratorial or laodicean"
but earned "enmity through nonconformity'.2l
Not all portraifs of Evatt are so flattering. Abba Eban, with his usual sharp tongue, said
of Evatr that, "His self-confidence was absolute. Behind his abrasive exterior lurked an
abrasive interior. He never allowed his resolution to be blunted by any confession of
fallibility".2e Brian Urquhart, a car@r civil servant at the UN, was 
-oven 
moro scathing.
After describing Evatt as "unpredictable, ambitious, and later on an almost paranoid
President of the General Assembly",Z3 he went on to say that "Evaft was a brilliant but
insecure man, almost paranoid in his desire to dominate and in his suspicion of those
around him. He was sven jealous of Eleanor Roosevelt".24 Michael Comay, who headed
the Israeli team at the UN, also considered that Evatt was insecure and had a weah ego.
Comay belioved that in May 1947 his flattery of Evatt and of his importance in the debate
had ohained Australia's commirnent to support partition, even while he carried on a
pretence of impaniality to advance his own carBer.S
Evatt's role as a champion of Israel emerged because he apptied his brain, political
skills and determination as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee of the General Assembly
and ushered fuough tlp'manoeuverings and the debate that culminated in that historic
vota on 29 November 1947 which recommended the partition of Palestine and the
creation of a Jewish state. He also committed Australia's vote to suppo$ partition. As
Evas noted on 25 November 1947, "abstention in the vote is the worst course to follow as
it would tend to lead to a sihration of abdicated responsibility on the part of the United
Nafions'.26
Renouf explains EvaEs commifnent to Israel as follows:
Thc.issue was olose o Bvart'e heart. Near associates record him as saying, as early as September
1945, that the Jewish people had to have a permanent home, where they could live in dignrty urd
self-respect, and 0ut hey had fuU historical rights in Palestine. If ttre Arabs reftrsd it, the United
Natioru had to decree and guarantee it. Ths expluration for Evatt's aninrde is justice. Awue of
the Jews' sufferings, he tried to create the conditions where thoso sufferings would not recur. He
led tlrc inveetigation by the United Nations whictr suggested ttrat tlrere drould be a lewish state
within Palestine; for Evas thero was, therefore, no altemative but to have thc state establishd.n
Though Renouf says Evatt "led the investigation' he is, in fact, refening to the Ad Hoc
Committee of the Goneral Assembly, rather than UNSCOP, the investigating committee.
The rcal question is why did Ausralia abstain on fte partition recomrnendation by
UNSCOP? Did John Hood, the career extemal affairs officer ap'pointed to UNSCOP, act
independently of government direction, as, in fact, did most of the otlpr members of the
Committee as they were expected to do? Not according to Evan.
I had always insisted, right from the first meeting of the Security Council in lorrdon of 1946,
that where there were disputed questioru beforo a United Nations body, a prop€r fourdation or
basis for any reeorrmendation must be discovered. It was thetefore essential thot Ors relevant
facts rhould be declred authoritatively afier ttre fullest investigation by an imprtial comrnittee
or commission. We hsd also ontended tltat fuU publicity must be given to all ttre findings of any
such oonuniE€es or coffidgsion.
Ausralia's point of view was pressed forward repeatedly wirh security Council disputes in
relation to karu Oreece and many other subjects. Tlre practice of enquiry and investigation had
become fairly well settled.
Accordingly when Australia was elected to UNSCOP our delegatee, John Hood and S. L. Atyeo,
joined in the full report of ths facts without committing Ausualia u the time to any firm decision
in retation to the rnajority and minority recommendation of LJNSCOP.2S
Two points are noteworfhy. One, Evatt clearly implies that the Ausralian delegates
voted accoding to Ausralian policy. Second, the rationale for abstention is given as the
policy of investigating bodies having fhe responsibility for ascertaining the facts and,
presumably, not making recommendations when there was a dispute over facts or
recommendations that stemmed from the analysis of those facts. Thus, although Ausralia
led the fight in San Francisco against the Yalta voting formula which allowed any one of
the five great powe$ a veto in the Security Council, in ttre final vote Ausralia
abstained,2g Ausralia was also a membsr of ttre United Nations Special Committee on the
Balkans ([JNSCOB). "The Ausnalian represeniatives ... dissented or abstained from
catagorical conclusions based on the presumption of observers."3O'When in October 1949,
the Fint Committee of the General Assembly called upon the President of ttre General
Assembly to negotiate with the Greek govemment suspension of deah sentences imposed
on eight individuals convicted of "political" offences, Australia abs6ined.3l
But there are explanations for these and other abstentions other than ones of procedural
principla On the isue of the veto, it might have meant no Charter and no United Nations
if Ausralia won. On tho issue of Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslavian support for Greek
guerrillas, the rationale for abstention was not attributsd to lack of unanimity but to fte
drawing of categorical conclusions otfact on the basis of scanty evidence. On the Greek
issue of the condemned political prisoners, "Australia's abstention may have arisen out of
anxiety at the action of th9^ Greek govefirment without any intention of creating a
precedent for intervention".32 And the principle of limiting LJN jurisdiction vis-a-vis
domestic issues was critical to Ausfalia. In other ryords, wherever there was an abstention
on the procedural principle, there seemed to be a substrantive motivo for Australia's
abstention. Alternatively, a different procedural principle (related to evidential support"
for example) was operadve. What was the underlying basis for the abstention in UNSCOP
if there was one?
Firstly, the abstention has no basis with respect to the restricted terms of reference to
which Evatt referred. Though clause 2 of the Terms of Reference states that, 'oThe special
committeo shall have the widest powers to ascertain and record facB, and o investigate
all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine", clauss 6 makes it perfectly
clear that UNSCOP was not just a fact-finding mission. "The special commitree shall
prepare a report to the General Assembly and shall submit such proposals as it may
consider appropriarc for the solution of the problem of Palestine."33 How unusu,al and
unexpected that abstention was can be gathered from the comments of other members of
LINSCOP. For example, Nicolaas Blom, ttre Durch representative on UNSCOP, a civil
servant in the Dutch Foreign Office, and the one other delegate taking direct orders from
his Ministry, referred to the Ausralian abstention as "incomprehensiblg" and "no[ greatly
appreciated".
Wellic,hf moet uit de voormeld€ onzekerheden verklaard worden de houding aangenome,n door
de Australisohe gedelegeerde, die zich geheel heeft ontloude,rr van het uitspreken van een ordeel.
Dat deze houding onbogrijpelijk wetd geacht en wenig waardering vond, behoeft geen betoog.
Torecht, naar mijn oordeol, waren alle leden van de Commissie van mening dat de Verenigde
Volke,lr, welko aatr de Commissie deze odpracht gave& mochten verwachten, dat de leden zich
niet aan het uitspreken van €on inzicht zouden onttrekken.34
But couldn't Hood have voted in the committee independently of Australian and, more
particularly, Evatt's policy? As Allan Dalziel described iL "John Hood, and o*rer senior
officers like Dr. Arntey Wynes, never seemed to be at home with the Evas brand of
bustling diplomacy".3s But if Hood voted conrary to Evatt's wishes, why then would
Evatt, who saw to it that he was head of the UN delegation, appoint someons who would
deviate, not only from Evatt's deep commitments, but from ttre majority of the members
of tlrc comminee? Why would Evan subsequently keep promoting Hood? In any case,
Evaft said Hood was following the policy as set down by the Australian delegation, i.e.,
Evatt. Does the role the Australian delegate played in UNSCOP clarify whether Evatt was
driven by expediency or was motivated by a passion for justice?
DrJohn Burton, appointed by Evatt as Secretary of the Department of Extemal Affairs,
accused Evatt of duplicity. "ln 1947 Evatt allegedly started to abandon principle in policy
for expediercy."36 Renouf, after all his research and his own close personal service to
Evatt, was unconvinced. Justice, not expediency, drove Evatt.
After the vote, as head of the UN delegation during a crucial period, Evatt Ied ilre
battle against the UK and US Starc Department team attempt to push through a hustoeship
proposal and reverse the IJN position on partition.3T On 8 April 1948, he issued an
instruction to John Hood, deparrmental head of the UN missionm, as follows: "the
Assembly decision was based on on-the-spot investigations by the United Nations and
extraustive discussion during ttre Assembly. The UnitedNations cannot lightly set aside a
decision adopted by two-ttrirds of ig members. Before, therefore, the Special Assembly
agre€s to reconsider its decision, those sponsoring reconsideration must give cogent
reasons, and the Special Assembly, which is in conEol of its own business, must then
decide whedrer in fact it will reconsider the decision."38 He wenl on to argue that there
were'ho cogent reasons for reconsideration". Trustceship, he concluded, "will not be
considered to offer a real solution".
Evatt led fte chargo in &e First Political Comminee and the Fouth Trusteeship
Committee in opposition o the higb powered cabal of the Sate Departmenr of rhe USA,
the UK and France which was then ryrng to reverse the partition decision. Even Canada
capinrlated and supported rusteeship.3g Though it was eventually dropped, Australia
sponsored a rival resolution m reaffirm partition. Ausralia could not see why any thought
should be given o interfering wittr parfition, "especially as the authority and credit of the
Unitsd Nations was involved".4o
EvatL it must be remembered, was one of the visionaries of and architects behind the
tnrsteestrip system.4t His support for trusteeship was bounded by two principles. "The
first was his refusal to go any further than self-goveilrment as the ond goal of tnrsteeship.
The second was his insistence on no interference wittr ttre sovereignty of the countries o
hold rusteeship."42 Evatt had argued for Fansferring murdates to trusteoships * San
Francisco, but withour granting sovereignty. Why had he now changed his mind and
instead demanded independence and opposed tnrsteeship?
Evatt's championship seemed brave but also foolhardy. For he coveted the Prrsidency
of the General Assernbly (a fact which was well known), and just lost out at the beginning
of the curent session.43 His stand on partition risked alienadng the pro-Arab vote for that
reason alone. But he went further and advocated the use of force by the Security Council
against ttre Arabs. That position risked alienating the Americans as well as the Arabs. He
worked assiduously to get the Security Council to take up ttre issue of Palestine prior to
the 15 May 1948 deadline so thatthe Security Council could declare a thrcat o peace and
adopt coercive measrues to prevent or inhibit an Arab invasion of Pale,stine after 15 May.
One draft resolution prepared by the Australian delegation called upon "the Arab states to
cease their defiance of the clearly stated intentions of the majority of the members of the
Unitpd Nations". Another draft included *ris passage: "DRAWS TIm ATTENfiON of
the Security Council to what must clearly be regarded as a threat to intemational peace
and security, and eamestly requests it to take such action under Chapter VII of ttre United
Nations Charter as might remove or alleviate this threat". The same draft called upon "the
Security Council to impose oconomic sanctions on Arab counries which send forces into
Palestine'.4 However, Ausnalia ended up as one of the leaders of tlre rearguard action to
prevent the UN from backsliding on its decision; there was no real oppornrnity, or
realistic prospect, to advance the principle conained in the United Nations Charter
whereby rhe United Nations would act collectively to repel aggression. Nevertheless, at
the beginning of lvlay 1948, he advised Truman (conrary to the known policy of the US,
both against the involvement of its own forces and an even sfxonger opposition to any
military involvementof theUSSR in the MiddleEast) to lead the intervention of the Great
Powers in the Palestine conflict. Truman hought his suggestion was prepost€rous.4s
Evatt had championed the trustaeship system without any entailment of sovereignty.
Now hs opposed fiusteeship and pushed independence. Evatt was critical of he role of the
Groat Powers, particularly the US urd the UK, but now advocated their intorvention in the
Middle Bast. Australia had absrrined in UNSCOP and now had become one of the most
ardent supporfers of partition. The last line of the report of the Ausralian delegation on
the whole debate starcd that, adopting partition "was the only possibte course that could
be taken and the only one consonanl with the proper auttrority and digniry of the United
Nadons".6 How does one explain all these apparent inconsistencies?
UNSCOP
Ausralia had not always given evidence of being an active champion sf the Zonist cause.
Quite the reverse. When the United Nations had been called into qpecial session in 6re
spring of 1947 to deal wittr its first major crisis 
- 
Palestine 
- 
Australia was a very
cooperative parher for the British in preventing the movement of illegal immigrants to
Palestine. Ausralia wenl so far as to refrrse to issue passports n is own citizens if their
destination was Palestine and they had not received prior approval from the British to
travel to Palestine. In a memo dalen?|- June 1947 from the Departrnent of Immigration to
the Department of External Affairs in Canbena, it was noted that "facilities for bavel to
Palestine (will only be granted) where it is clear that applicants are eligible o enter that
country in accordance with Palestine immigration regulations. In cases of doubt it is the
invariable rule to make prior reference o the Commissioner for Immigration, Jerusalem,
and to withhold the grant of pasqpon facilities unless and until advice is received from
that official that an intending traveller will be permitted to land."4?
Nor could Evatr be said to be unaware of this policy. In fact the UK had sent a qpecial
letter to Dr H. V. Evatt, Minister of State for Extemal Affairs in Canberr+ to do "all in
their power to discourage illegal immigruion while the question remains std jndics".48
Evatt may even have been the architect of the poticy.
However, Ausralia's cooperation with Briain and lack of sympathy with the Zionist
cause was much more home grown thu simply the product of a compliant excolony
doing the mother counEy's bidding. This became clear in Ausralias initial role on
LINSCOP. Ausralia had won irs place on UNSCOP by only one vote over the Philippines.
The vote was 2l to 20. This was in qpite of the fact that Ausualia campaigned to win the
appoinrnent (in conrast to Canada or the Netherlands, both of which had been reluctant
to take on that role). In fact, in a ministerial merno dated 22 April 194?, it was declared
that the "main purpose of Australian participation in session is lo secure for this country a
place on tlre body to report to the regular session".49 The marginal support may have been
the result of a perception by other delegates that Australia would serve as a ringer for the
UK.
IJNSCOP was charged with sudying the situation and bringing back recommendations
to the United Nations Special Assembly so that it could determine a course of action.
"The primary function of the committee was to ascertain the facts and make a
recommendation to the regular General Assembly."S0 In tre final report of UNSCOP
tabled at the beginning of September of. 1947, other than supporting the unanimous
recommendations calling for an end to the lvlandate and the granting of independence lo
the peoples of Palestine, the Australian delegate, John Hood, neither supported the
majority recommendation for partition backed by the seven delegates from Sweden,
Canada Uruguay, Peru, Guatemala, the Nettrerlands and Czechoslovakia, nor the
minority recommendation of India, Iran and Yugoslavia for a Federal Sate. The
Australian abstained.
This abstention could have had grave consequences. For the divisions in the cornmitteo
were much $eater ttran they even appeared in the final report. The DuEh delegate, Dr
Nicolaas Blom, like Hood, and unlike many of the others who were judges or politicians,
was a career civil servant. He had spent most of his life as a colonial adminisEator in
Indonesia. He and Hood seemed to share an affinity in the UNSCOP committee in ttreir
methodological and unassuming approach to issues. Both played their cards very close !o
their rcqpective chests. David Bercuson drew the same conclusion I did after reading the
minutes of LJNSCOP that John Hood "took grcat pains, during his tonure at UNSCOP, not
to'revesl to his fellow committee members his innermost impressions or thoughts on fhe
issue at hand".5l Neither ook the lead in most of ttre discussions. But when the committee
- 
armed wittr the rationale that part of its terms of refcrence called for.ths parties to the
conflict n desist from acts of violence while the Commiueo was doing its work 
-appeared to ttrem to be veering off course when it decided to complain to ttre British
against dre British decision m hang three convicted hgun terrorists, Hood and Blom
joined togeher to prote,st stongly. They believed this rilas a gross deviation from the
terms of reference of fte Commiuee and an intprference with those chuged with.the
adminisEation of the lvlandate.
This pro-British stance $,as in strarp eontrast o the original worries the British had
about Hood "AusEalian Delegation have received instnrctions to press sftongly for
Australian representation and Australian Government havo indicated to their delegation
that Hood would be their choice ...' alrd it woul4 therefore, be *useful fo United
Kingdom Delegation o have some indication from Windle as to Hood's suiuability in light
of Balkan Commission's experience'.S2
Blom had clear instructions from the Dutch foreign office to avoid alienating the fuabs
as the Dutch needed their support to retain conrol over Indonesia.S3 It was only when it
was clear that the evidence overwhelmingly fnvoured partition, and that there was a clear
majority in favour of partition, that the Durch delegate was permitted by the Foreign
Office to commit his vote to support the majority recommendation. But Hood had no
inkling 9f ttte Dutch instruction, ttrough he did sense Dutch opposition to partition in early
Augus154 The reluctance of the Dutch to confide in ttre Ausralians was probably rooted
in a combination of diplomatic reserve and ttre conviction that Evatt and Australia were
hostile to 8re interests of the Nethertands in IndonesiaS5 fighting had broken out between
tho Durch govemment and the indigenous population of Java and Sumatra on 20 July
1947. On 30 Juty it was Australia that brought the issue before the tlN Security Council
which Holland declared to be interference in its domestic jurisdiction. The mu$al
suqpicion of Holland and Ausualia meant that Hood and Blom, in spite of or because of
similar civil servant styles and subservience to their ministries, were not able to
collaborate.
Everyone knew the Peruvian delegate would vote any way as long as ttre Vatican was
satisfied and the Holy places were secured from the Muslim and Jowish factions by an
intemational jurisdiction. Dr Arturo Garcia Salazar, a devout Catholic, was Peru's
ambassador to the Vatican. "His religious views coloured his approach to the Palestine
question and inclined him to concenEate on the issue of Jerusalem and ttre holy.places
morc than any otlrer aspect of the prob1em".56 If fire Peruvian and the Dutch delected
ftom the majority, there would be only five for partition and five against. Ilood, the
Ausualian would have had the deciding vote.
Who was Hood and why did he absrain in the UNSCOP commiuee?
John Hood
John Hmd was a career civil servant who joined the Depanment of External Affairs six
months afier his twin daughters, Catherine Bridget and fuina Elisabeth, were born. He
was assigned to Australia House in April 1936. He finished his probationary period on 14
Ocober 1936 and received his first promotion in April 1937, one year after he joined ttre
deparfinent. Hood was appointed Offiser-in-Charge of Political Section in Canberra,
received anotherrise, and returned to Ausralia after 15 December 1938.
Hood was not very useful to his political masters in predicting the ensuing
conflagration. In that he shared the predominant isolationist and appeasement attifides
that dorninated Ausralian perceptions, particularly those of the Labour party. On 26 lvlay
1939, Hood welcomed Halifa:c's recent statement on Anglo-German relations and
supporte{ the Chamberlain srategy. EvaS was far more prescient for he wamed
Ausralians about the gathering storm clouds. Hood was also mistaken in a number of
specifics. He ttrought that a Soviet$erman pact was impossible. On 14 June 1939 he
wroto a departmental memo stating that he was "doubtful about the military value of
Russia, and I have never regarded as,serious the possibility of an ar-rangement being
anived at by Germany and the USSR'.57 As war became more and more imminent, Hood
became more and more resistant to accepting the impending reality. nuThe Government has
given no lroof of any sort of emergency and ... Australia has allowed itself to be caught
up in a war scare which has no real foundation."5E
Nevertheless, in spite of these shortcomings as a prophet, he continued his rapid rise in
the Departnent. And in qpite of being totally at odds with Evatt about the coming war,
duing and after the war he moved closer to the centre of power. h 1945, John Hood, as
the senior representative of the Department, along with Sam L. Atyeo 
- 
who woutd
become the Australian alternate on UNSCOP 
- 
travelled wittr Evatt on a Special Mission
to London via Jerusalem, a trip which began on 4 September 1945 after Evatt had
tetumed from his riumph in San Francisco.S9 Whether the stop in Jerusalern had any
relationship to the special mission, I was not able to learn.
Hood was very busy. Using London as a base, he went for six days to Paris, after being
strulded for nvo days in Bnrssels, and then went on to The llague to establish an
Ausmalian legation where he held "a toaming commission as charge d'affaires".60 He
returned to London on 23 November only to set off again for Holland three days later and
to Berlin on ttre 30th to establish a military mission. Hood was a member of the
Ausralian Delagation 0o thc Reparations Conference.
Hood subsequently took up his position as departmental head of the Austratian
delegation at the UN. He could only have attained that position in Evatt's beloved UN
because Evatt had great trust that Hood would serve him well. Evatr, was too dominating a
personality to tolerat€ a strong minded wilful individual in the institution fhat was so close
to his hearr Evafi did not choose Hood because of his brilliance as a political
prognosticator. Hood was no more prescient at the UN than he had been in 1939. With
respect to Palesting he wrote in a widely shared conviction that the'lrobabilities are in
favouof its ltheUSSR] supporting t]re Arab claims".61
Though Hood would go on to serve as Ambassador to Indonesia fuom24 June 1950 to
26 February t952,Q and from 1952 to 1958 served as Ambassador to Germany, following
which he was appointed Director of Scientific Secretarid, International Atomic Energy
Commission, and even became Ambassador to Israel, Hood's moment of international
glory came when he was appointed to UNSCOP in April 1947. Abba Eban described
Hood as "a professional diplomat whose sharp mind was concealed by an easygoing
disposition and a very marked taste for conviviality'.53 The deparrnent had
recommended that Moore be appointed,64 but Evatt saw to it that Hood got fte position.
Atyeo, "Evatt's eyes and ears on lhe world",55 was appointed as his alternate. Evatt now
had his two most ftust€d licutenants on a Commission thau would make fte critical
recommendadon on the fuhre of Palestine.
Hood on UNSCOP
Hood recognised what his role on {.JNSCOP was supposed to be, as his own memo attests.
"The balance of the 11 members [were to] be selected on the basis of geographical
dis8ibution and neutrality on the issues."6 Furthermore Evatt also knew ttrat Hood was
appointed as an independent mernber. olrr2.4 lvlay 1947, after Hood took up his position,
the Ausralian Ambassador cabled to the Minister noting the Rand appoinunent by
Canada and that in this cass "it is not proposed to issue him any specific insnrctions".
Canada's appointee was qpecifically insnucted by Extemal Affairs Minister St Iaurent
(soon to become Prime Minister) "to act in an independent capacity"6T as much to
preserve Canada's flexibility as to ensure that the "best possible person" would serve with
distinction. "The Canadian representative has not been insrucbd by fhe Canadian
government concerning the policy he is to advocate or support",5E St l-aurcnt announced
to ttre House of Commons on 22 lvlay 194?. Wrong (tre Canadian Ambassador to
Washington) said that Rand was regarded as an able lawyer who had been a member of
the Court for apploximately three years. '\Ifrong also mentioned that the Swedish
Government nnded to follow the same course regarding instructions to its Representative
on the committee."69 Hood was not, on the special committee o defend the interests or
represent the views of Ausralia. Nevorttreless, as we shall see, unlike Rand and
Sandstrom, but like Bloom and Spitz of the Nettrerlands,To 
"* 
and Atyeo received their
instructions from ttre Departmentof Extemal Affairs.
Hood's responsibility to act as an independent, neufial investigator was made clear in
the terms of rpferencc sent by the UN to ttre Ausralian delegation on 16lvlay l%?. They
stated that "States Members of the Special Committee should appoinr persons of high
moral character and of recognised competence in Intemuional Affairs, and that thoso
appointed would act impartially and conscientioraly (emphasis added) in accordance with
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations'.?l Hood was not there to
be a delegate representing the Deparment of External Affairs of Ausnalia.
Hood was not only supposed to be independent, but LJNSCOP was set up expticitly as
a "neuFal" committee. The neutraliry was to be a product of its overall composition and
not the lack of any predisposition of its members. Neutrality meant lack of prior sated
cornmitrnents and an adherence to procedural fairness. It did not mean absence of bias.
A country or a representative would be considered partial; (a) if its delegate already
expressed a prior commitrnen[ to one outcome or another; O) if its existing commitments
predetermined one outcome ra8rer than another; or (c) if it had a vested interest in ttre
outcome. The Arab stiates were clearly not neutral, and that is why their presence on the
commifiee 
- 
supported by ttre Australian delegation 
- 
was rejected.T2 Neitlrer was the
UK, but the Australiut delegate was expected to be. And he was, insofar as he had never
puhlicly expressed support for either the Jewish or the Arab positions. He was not neural,
however, in the sense that his commitments did rule out his voting in favour of the Zionist
position. Ausnalia did, as we shall see, have a vested interest in one outcome. In ttre case
of Holland, that vesled interest was based on the foreign policy concern with favouring
thc Arabs to win their suppo,rt for the Dutch position on Indonesia. What was the vested
interest of Australia?
Thore were four major concerns that would inlluence Hood's role in ttre Special
Committee 
- 
his attitude to the Jews, the UK, the Arabs and his view of Ausnalia. His
attitude to fhe Jews can be discerned from the fact tlnt he (and Sir AMur Rahman of India
as well as Bloom and Spitz of Holland)73 opposed going to visit Displaced Persons (DP)
Camps ttrat held the Jewish DPs in Burope.Ta Perhaps because of that opposition, he was
chosen to head the subcommitteo of UNSCOP that visit€d the camps. Although he cabled
his department with up-o-date reports on the proceedings of UNSCOP, there is not one
word in the files about his visit fo the camps, a rcsponse that stands in marked contnst to
the powerful impression the visit made on the other members of his subcommitree. This
silence is also in stark conrast to Abba Eban's conviction (with no evidence citBd) that" "I
had also noticed a positive change in John Hood's auitude since his traumatic contact with
the diqplaced persons in the European csmps)'.75 Did Abba Eban have any evidence?
Hood was cerfainly unsympathetic to the crcation of a Jewish State in Palestine as his
early report to the Deparunent on UNSCOP attests. He "considered that the claims for
immediate independence and for a Jewish State to be founded by accelerated migration
over the next few years were equally umeal and offered little prospect of stability".76
Eban's view, based as he says only on intuition, was'*that behind his [Hood's] maddening
reticence there was now a tendsncy to accept our cause".?? What was really behind
Hood's "maddening reticence" we will soon show.
Hood was also very critical of other members of the Committee for their criticism of
the UK. "Some members, notably Yugoslavia, Uruguay and Guatemala, seemed to regard
the Committee as a super Royal Commission charged with investigating and passing
judgement on ttre history of the adminisradon of the Mandanry."78 Hood cited India,
Canada and surprisingly enough, Yugoslavia as supporting this critique. He considered
that the view of the majority, *held most firmly by India, Canada and Ausualia, was that
intorvention in such matt€r was outside the compet€nce and furrctions of fire
Committpe",79
This was in line with Australian govemment support for Britain, even after Britain,
following the tabling of the LJNSCOP report, announced that it was withdrawing torally
from Palestine. As Prime Minister Chifley said in the House of Representatives, "the UK
government should no longer be expected to carry the burden of maintaining what was
virtually a police forco in Palestine".80
The Australian delegation's guiding policies are stated clearly in the records of the
Departrnent of External Afiairs where they were commitfed to "support the UK in general
provided no fundamental conflict with Ausralian views".8l Further, even if the UK
should decide to agree to complete withdrawal from Palestine,'hny plan for immediate
uansfer of power shouldbe opposed on the ground that no solution is likely to please both
Arabs and Jews and the risk of a violent reaction to an unpopular solution would be
considerable'.82 Thus, even though the Australians envisioned the possibility of Britain
sunendering the Mandate, and even though they envisioned partition as the likely
outcome, they did not favour the creation of two independent states, but the creation of
two trusf€eships, the "US over Jewish stats and an Arab country over Arab Palestine".83
This conviction about a trusteeship pre-dated Hmd's service on LINSCOP and his
Department's ostensible direction to arrive at a conclusion based on ttre facts and "to insist
on a full enquiry into the facts and the law before any recommendation is submined to a
vote".84 The Ausralians initially suggested that the "UK submit separate Trusteeships for
an fuab and a Jewish portion of Palestine with large areas of self-govemment".85 The
Australians believed that trusteeship was just the application of the Principles of the
Charter which obliged tlrc UK "to submit a Trusteeship agreement for Palestine with
provision for early selfgovernment and independence".S6 The UN Ausralian delegation
on 29 August was committed to "accept trusteeship in the interim".87 However, the
Australian delegation received a report on 28 October 194? which was pessimistic
concerning trusteeship basedon the fruitless failure of UN military stiaff committ€es.
The Australian position even went byond that of the UK when it came to their
pro-Arab sand. On 18 April 1947 the UN delegation registered their conviction that an
Arab sate should have been a member of UNSCOP. "There should be representation of
membors acceptable to the Palestinian Arabs and Jews, e.9., an Arab lrague Membor
[Eg]?t or Syria was suggestpdl and the United States."88 Why did they hold ttris view?
Did tlteir bclief that they were winning favour with the Arab states have anything to do
with it? "We are one of the few Delegations to recain ttre confidence and gmdwi[ of Arab
States which will be useful in September.'8e Useful for what in September? The
explanation they gave publicly was that tlrey were willing to consider the proposed Arab
adition versus ttp UK because "Australia had always stood for a full and exhmrstive
investigation of all the facts hfore any decision was trken on the substance of matters
arising in the United Nations".9o But in their repon for the autumn Session, they claimed
that, 'fustice and Australia's interests are most clearty allied to the Arab cause which
demands a uniAry state".gl Did ttrat have anyttring to do with the fact that Evatt was
campaigning hard to become President of the General Assernbly?
Hood had explained his decision t,o abstain unless decisions were unanimous. That
explanation, as far as I know, has never been challenEd,,gz But it doesn't make sense.
Why had Hood besn willing rc sit on the subcommittee of UNSCOP dealing with
boundarie.s when he knew panition would never be supported unanimously in the
Committee? Was the principle of trusteeship and a pro-Arab conviction the real reason for
the abstention? Why was it in Ausnalia's interest to be pro-Arab? What use would
winning hvour with the fuabs be "in September"? How can we reconcile these pro-Arab
convictions and o'pposition 0o an independent Jewish state with Hood's stat€ment to the
British, "that his country had supported partition all along"93 (emphasis added).
fire explanation, I believe, is to be found in a self-serving desire to rewrite history
when the real motives for the Australian policy on Palestine were a combination of the
White Australia pollcy (the policy of restricting immigrants to Ausralia to those of
European descent), of which both Evar and Hood werc strong defenders, and Evatt's
personal ambition. In a report Hood wrote in proparation for the autumn Session of t947
explaining the stand of the Ausralian delegation, he sarcd ftat respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-detetmination of peoples as provided in Article 73 of the United
SArcs Charter where "peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-govemment,
recognize the principle that the interests of tlre inhabitants of those territories aro
paramount",94 Evafi was the constinrtional expen He was directly responsible at San
Francisco for tfte amendments to Article ?3 making precisely ttris provision.95 The
wording was Evatt's,
How did the Ausfralian delegation interpret the provision? The UN would have to
consult the population. "It also means that a solution which would force the inhabitants,
against tlv will of tlw majority to accept any alteration in the constitution of its population
strould be opposed. In fact, from Ausralia's point of view there would be a narrow line
between the United Narions attempti$g to impose upon the Palestinian Arabs an
obliguion to admil further Jewish immigrants and the United Nations arempting to open
the doors of Australia to Asiatic immigration on the pretext that the failure to do so might
endanger the peace and that the Australian immigration policy was contrary to the
pnnciple of the Charter in so far as it involved raciat dissrimination".lx As Hood went on
to write, the problem of Jewish DPs, "should not be solved at the expense of the Palestine
Arabs and can only be solved by the co-operation of all member stales".
It was the White Ausualia potcy which dictated majority conrol on racial grounds
against newcomers. The principle of racial discrimination was not to interfere in the
domosdc jurisdiction of a majority populacion. But if the situation in Palestine could not
be solved except through partition, then it was critical that the community not be given
independence, otherwise that independence would justify majority control ovor
immigration. Trusteeship did not entall self-determination in the Evatt view, but only
self-governmenl As quorcd earlier,97 "At UNCIO lUnited Nations Conference on
International Organisationl Evatt gave two small indications of what would become his
approach. The first was his refusal to go any further than self-government as the end goal
of trusteeship, The second was his insistence on no interference with the sovereignty of
the countries to hold tusteeships."gS Hood's argument, in his report duectly reflected
Evatr's legal conviction tlrat even self-government was nof entailed by trusteeship. "Even
gxanting the Jewish claim that the Mandate is still in force and binding in IntBrnational
Law and ftat it supersedes all of the earlier United Kingdom promises, the Mandatp does
not oblige the Mandatory to safeguard the civil and religious rights of all ilre inhabitants
and to introduce self-governing instinrtions."$
Thus lack of sympathy for the Jews, tho pro-UK outlook, the pro-Arab attitude and the
self interest of Australia and its policy of preserving White Ausralia were all of a piece.
This meant that the Australian delegation was prro-Arab and not pro-Zionist Why then did
Hood give the impression in the latter half of August of 1948 t}at he was p,ropartition
even though he never so declared himself? Why did Hood abstain and not vote for a
unified federal state with the minority? Why in OcOber 1947 did the Australian
delegation reverse its stand and come out strongly in suppon of panidon?
On 7 August 1947, Hood cabled to Canbena that "There is however no support for
extreme claims for either side and very little support at this stage even for partition.'1O0
Possibly this was in response to an exprgssion of fear that there was such support Tlre
effect, however, was to arouse fears in Evatt ttrat Hood would take a stand against
partition. On 10 August 1947 he Minister cabled the Ambassador in Geneva 
- 
where ttre
commisee had retreated to write their repon 
- 
to'"Tell Hood at once that he should not
at this stage take any line against partition of Palestine. He has never been authorised to
da so and is there solely to reryrt on events qnd not to [i[egible] without prior ffictal
conwltation with us. This is most tugenl I have had recent complainfs of the auinrde of
one of the Ausfalian representatives on the Palestinian Commiuee. They must be
reminded ttrat they ars a fact finding body.'lOl
The Evatt line had been dictated to Hood. No stand at all. Why? And why did Hood
not act as ttre independent delegate he was supposed to be? He tried. On 18 August 1947,
with npo weeks to go in the deadline to complete the report, Hood cabled External Affairs
that "We have so far not taken any positive attitude in accordance with what I undentand
was the general sense of the Minister's wishes and also because of ttre complexity of the
problem itself which has made it essential to give fair and careful examination to each in
turn, of various solutions proposed". But Hood continued, "At the same time from now
onwards it will become increasingly difficult for us to abstain from taking a position in
respect to at least some final recommendations. There is no sign of any intention on part
of most other members to refrain from committing themselves. On contrary many take
view that more positive and explicit recommendadons are made the better."l02
Hood also tried to say, in diplomatic language, of course, that Evatt's insistence that the
Committee's mandate was to serve only as a fact finding body was just so much rubbish.
"\Ve fully understand ttre view of the Committee as primarity a fact-finding body, but
having regard !o the way in which Commiree's work has developed, and also to the terms
of reference from the qpecial assembly it is not a practical question to exclude
recommendations from the repo4."l03
But Hood, ever the loyal civil servant, then went on to say that he was making every
effort n avoid committing ttre Ausralian delegation. "What we ars trying to onsure is tlut
the report will haverse fully all possible solutions with possibly an indication of
preference in favour of one particular course, thus allowing the Assembly to be presented
with a complete picture of ttre problem. Some members would wish to go further than
this, and !o present simply a single majority conclusion to Assembly, but I think this can
be avoided. In any case we will raurally take every preccution to avoid any undesirable
e xt e nt of Austr allan c a mmit mefi .n lM
Hood then made clear where he wanted to make the commitment 
- 
not, to vote for
partition, but against T?ris was on 18 August. There "might after all be found to be no
alternative but o impose a Tfusteeship in Palestins wi8r Palestinian self-Government as
ultimate Sjective, we had a large measure of agreement from Netherlands, Indian arrd
Iranian members".16
Hood then requested ttrst the decision be lefr to the delegation's discretion and
suggested that partition with an economic confederation probably had majority support.
"On present showing possibly a majority of some sev€n or eight will come down in
favour of some such arrangement. I tldnk our own attitude should be left to our discretion,
in light of your G82 and of course proposed in paragraph 3 above [rcference to taking
precautions to avoid any undesirable extent of Ausfalian commiunent], but if you have
any cotnments, we would appreciate receiving them at earlie.st possible moment, as we
shall have to make our attitude cler in the very near fuhra"l06 But Hood then
immediately went on !o say frrat discretion would imply abstention. "Our own idea if [sic]
of what this anitude should be is thar while assisting on presentation to Assembly of as
clear and comprehensive a plan as possible for partition, plus confederatioq we should
leave our ultimate position open.Dlffl
Therc were also objective grounds, or so Hood argued, tro keep one's options open.
Hood asked whether each entity would be considered sovereign and eligible for IJN
membership, "which is one of presumed objects of participation to securs"? He was
sceptical whether any solution was politically feasible given Arab-Iewish animosity and
the fact that no final judgement could be rendered until the attitudes of Arab states and
other governments were made known in the Assembly. He noted tlrc problem that if there
was partition the Jewish State woutd be thirty-three per cent to fifty per cant Anb.l08
The deparrnent, as woll as evoryono else on the Committeg, now became baffled by
Hood's equivocation. Give me the authority, but don't worry, I won't exercise it to
embarrass the government. There is a majority in favour of partition with economic union,
but I dont think it is workable, and am opposed to partition, but think I should abstain
because I don't want to embarrass the Minister.
The department began a two-track policy. Keep a tight rein on Hood so he won't
embarrass the Minister. Disown Hood as rcpresenting only his own views and not those of
Australia. In a cable dated 2l August they instruct€d Hood, "You should avoid being
associated witlr any recommendation which will embanass the Minister later having been
supported by his representative".ls At the same time they provided an outlet the very
next day. "The Australian Government considers the Commission to be an independent
body repesenting the assembly as a whole and that any particular course you may support
is without commimrent to the Govemmen;sll0
On 23 August 1947, Hood received definite instructions fiorn the Department of
External Affairs. "Most imporAnt we should not be committed to any recommendation."
'Fact and alternativs solutions and not recommendations should be included."lll Hood
cabled back the next day indicating a majority support for partidon, his preference for tlre
minority rcport for a federation, the impending pressure on Ausralia to mako up ie mind
and his preference to do so, and then the irnportant note that Hood and Atyeo had not yet
cornmicpd themsolvef. India, Yugoslavia and lran were the threo other counries
favouring a Federation. Sweden, Canada, Uruguay, Guatpmala were for partition. There
were now fotu votes to ttree fo partition. Hood went on. "It will be necessary for us [o
decide within few days whether to take an anitude in favour of one or the other of
alternative plans or whether !o reserve our position until Assembly.! "On balance our own
feelings which we have not stated in committee is for Federation in preference to partition
on grounds that by porpstuating Arab/Jewish antagonism partition will creata arr many
problems as it solves."ll2 }Ioo6 could not have been clearer that he was opposed to
partition, but he promised ho would keep his position open in the meanwhile.
On n August t947 rhe Middle East Section cabled Hood with dofinite orders. The
tenns of reference of UNSCOP were to "submit such proposals as it may consider
appropriate for ttre solution of the problem of Palestine'. Therefore, it was the "obligation
on the Committee to go as far as Hood's suggestion in first sentence of paragraph 3 of
LJNSCOP 8", i.e. to present altematives and present majority recommendations. Hood
was not to vote, but if he voted, he was not to vot€ against partition.tl3 At the same time,
the Depanmem prepared a rarionale for disowning Hood. "Although it is realised that
there may be an element of embarrassment to the Minister if Hood supports a panicular
solution and the Minister subsequently wishes to support another, it may be considered
that such an apparent change of front could be explained on the following basis 
- 
the
special Committee does not solely rcpresent fte eleven Nations but represeng all of the
members of the Assembly which have delegated their ask !o it. As such ths Committee is
a body responsible to the Assembly to obtain and use imprtially irs specialised
knowledge."l14
The only position that would not embanass Australia no\ry was one that was
propartition. 'Tt does not app€ar tlrat support for panition as the ultimate solution should
be likely to embanass Australia,-so long as the recommended solution does not require an
immediate transfer of po6re1'. " I I 5
Hood decided discretion was the better part of valour. On 28 August he provided nvo
rationales for abstention. There was "no necessity to indicate now a preference for one
proposed arrangement over another as the final determination could only be in the hands
of tlp As-se'mbly". Secondly, there was the issue of workabitity given all the political
fxgtors,l16
The Autumn Session
Hood and Evatt were for trusteeship, pro-Arab, pro the UK, brrt mostly pro a White
Ausralia and the advancement of Evafi's political ambitions. The combination of factors
inclined Hood to votp against partition and for a federation. Eva$ was determined to keep
his powder dry and his options open and prevailed upon Hood to abstain.
Why then did Ausralia reverse itself and come out in support of partition? FirsL Evatt
was not elected as Prcsident of the General Assembly. This freed him from any immediate
political factors determining his stand. Secondly, the UK decided to wittrdraw from the
situation alogether; this removed the factor of Ausralian loyalty to the UK. Third,
Australia, Iike ttre US and most other countries, was unwilling to intercede by providing
their own volunteer forces to police a trusteeship.
On I October 1947 PimeMinister Chifley announced in the House of Representativos,
in answer to a question from he opposition, that "no Ausualian troops will be sent to
Palestine. Of that the honorable member can be completely confidenq and in addition he
c,an rcst assured that we will be making no contribution to the work of the administration
in Palestine."ll7 16t Ausnalians were still supporting the tIK and supported ttre British
decision not to blockade arms to the Arabs since Britain had to adhere to its treaty
obligations, unless of course there was a UN resolution to that effecr
Evatt's ambition had been thwarted. The UK had tumed its back on the problem, and,
increasingly they also turned their back on any reqponsibility to keep members informed.
The British did not even have the grace to tell the ruttr. The Jews were clearly brave and
determined.Finally, a two state solution would allow each state to restrict immigration or
reinforce immigration from its own ethnic group, a position perfectly consistent with what
would emerge as a dominant motif in both ttre Jewish, fuab and the general intprnational
relations community, butparticularly in the USA.
Why then did Evatt end up supporting Israel and helping it achieve a two-thirds vote in
the General Assembly for partition? The decision came near the very end of a long,
grue[ing session. By ttre time Australia jumped aboard, there was almost a two-thirds
majority for partition. If Australia now voted against partition, Australia would have been
alienated from almost two-thirds of the delegations. There were now more pro-Israel
votes than pro-Arab votes. Ausfalia voted for partition.
There is also the possibility that in the course of the debate, Evattbecame convinced of
the s&onger arguments in favorr of partition. But even then, the arguments were ones in
support of a pottically practicable solution rafter than any principle of justice. Not even
the principle of least injustice seemed to be the issue .
It was not justice or the awarcness of Jewish suffering that impelled the Ausralian
vote. It was expediency and practical politics. Principle did not provide the primary
guides for Australian action, The principles and the policies that the Ausralians held
dictated support for a unitary state. The Ausralians fust absaind even ttrouglr they were
pro-Arab, and then voted for partition when that was ttre prevailing direction in which the
political winds were blowing and there were no longer any countenniling forces pushing
in thc other direction,
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